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Abstract
The design of employment protection legislation (EPL) is of particular importance in the
European debate on the contours of labor market reform. In this article we appeal to an
equilibrium unemployment model to investigate the virtues of EPL reform which reduces
the red tape and legal costs associated with layo®s and introduces a U.S.-style experience-
rating system, which we model as a combination of a layo® tax and a payroll subsidy. The
reform considered shows that it is possible to improve the e±ciency of employment protection
policies without a®ecting the extent of worker protection on the labor market. These results
are consistent with the conventional wisdom that experience rating is desirable, not only as
an integral component of unemployment-compensation ¯nance, as most studies acknowledge,
but also as part and parcel of a virtuous EPL system.
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11 Introduction
Over the past few decades, most continental European countries have experienced high and
persistent unemployment rates, while the U.S. labor market has performed relatively well. The
bulk of labor market research has tackled these contrasting situations by emphasizing the e®ect
of employment protection legislation, hereafter EPL, on labor market performance. As a result,
the importance of labor market °exibility has been widely acknowledged. This view can be
summarized by the expressed desire of the E.U. council to give member States incentives to
\review and, where appropriate, reform overly restrictive elements in employment legislation
that a®ect labor market dynamics [...] and to undertake other appropriate measures to promote
a better balance between work and private life and between °exibility and security". It is however
striking that most of the reforms undertaken in the last two decades have contrasted sharply
with this latter recommendation of favoring reforms at the margin in continental Europe. More
precisely, reforms have fostered two-tier systems, as the increase in labor market °exibility
has taken place mainly through a series of marginal reforms that liberalized the use of ¯xed-
term and/or non-standard employment contracts, favoring the status quo for workers employed
on conventional contracts (OECD, 2004 and 2005). It follows that employment protection
arises in a very particular form in such two-tier labor markets because there are both highly-
protected stable jobs and unstable jobs with short durations and little protection. The marginal
reforms produce a divided labor market, with an unequal repartition of risk between workers and
uncertain e®ects on economic outcomes (Blanchard and Landier, 2002, Cahuc and Postel-Vinay,
2002, and Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007). In addition a number of authors have pointed out that
workers with regular contracts may only be super¯cially protected, as indicated by the very few
fair or justi¯ed dismissals in job destruction °ows (Boeri, Bertola and Cazes, 2002, and Cahuc
and Kramarz, 2005).
Designing Employment Protection Reform: Given the limitations of current EPL, it seems
legitimate to ask what a good reform of employment protection would look like. This seemingly
simple question is hotly debated in the context of European employment protection reforms
(E.U. Council, 2003, and OECD, 2004). In the particular case of France, a series of recent
policy reports has tried to outline the design of such reforms (Blanchard and Tirole, 2003a,
Cahuc, 2003, and Cahuc et al., 2005). In the words of Blanchard and Tirole (2003b) such a
reform should:
\[...] increase the contribution rate of ¯rms (that is to introduce a layo® tax, and
decrease the corresponding payroll tax) so ¯rms internalize the cost of unemployment.
2[...] limit the role of the judicial system. To the extent that ¯rms are willing to incur
the ¯nancial costs associated with laying o® workers [...] judges should not be allowed
to second guess the ¯rms' decision."
With respect to European institutions, it is obvious that these two recommendations are at odds
with most current European systems, and in particular with the French labor market where
¯rms' marginal contribution rate is zero and where layo®s are subject to heavy administrative
and legal constraints. These recommendations re°ect the U.S. unemployment insurance system:
while layo® costs are mostly due to EPL in European countries, they essentially come from
experience-rated unemployment insurance in the U.S.. The systematic use of experience rating
is a particular feature of U.S. unemployment bene¯ts, where in most states ¯rms are taxed as
a function of their separations. As such, experience rating is a way of requiring employers to
contribute to the bene¯t payments they cause via their ¯ring decisions. This internalizes the
cost of an additional layo® to the unemployment insurance system for ¯rms. To our knowledge,
experience rating is unique to the U.S. (Baicker, Goldin and Katz, 1997) and is absent from all
other OECD countries (see Holmlund, 1998, for a survey).
In this article, we evaluate the e®ects of an EPL reform which would introduce a U.S.-like
experience-rating system, modeled as a combination of both a layo® tax and a payroll subsidy,
and a reduction in the red tape and legal costs associated with layo®s. It is worth noting that
whereas the debate on employment protection reform has mainly asked whether it is desirable
to tighten the stringency of EPL, the approach advocated here takes a di®erent perspective. We
rather consider whether it is possible to improve the e±ciency of EPL for a constant degree of
stringency, i.e. to reform employment protection while leaving workers' job security unchanged.
What can we expect from the introduction of such a layo® tax? Since Feldstein's (1976)
seminal paper, an abundant literature has developed dealing with the e®ects of experience
rating.1 Feldstein (1976) was among the ¯rst to o®er a theoretical analysis of experience rating
in a model of temporary layo®s, which are frequent in the U.S. economy. The arguments in favor
of experience rating stem from the fact that the payroll taxes used to ¯nance unemployment
bene¯ts give rise to ine±ciently high levels of layo®s, as ¯rms do not take into account the
cost of ¯nancing the bene¯ts paid to unemployed workers. To avoid this excess job destruction,
unemployment bene¯ts should be ¯nanced through a layo® tax. A system with perfect experience
rating will likely reduce temporary layo®s and improve labor market performance. This view has
been challenged2 by Burdett and Wright (1989), Marceau (1993) and more recently by Mongrain
1See Holmlund (1998) or Malherbet (2003) for a survey.
2See Malherbet (2003) or Cahuc and Malherbet (2004) for a discussion.
3and Roberts (2005) who show that a perfect experience-rating system may produce adverse
labor market outcomes. In general, the empirical analysis of experience rating supports the
analysis proposed by Feldstein (1976), ¯nding strong evidence that experience rating decreases
unemployment (Anderson, 1993, Card and Levine, 1994 and Anderson and Meyer, 2000).
It may be tempting to generalize the results of the main U.S. studies in this area to Europe.
However, the U.S. results need to be interpreted cautiously in the European context for at
least two reasons: (i) The U.S. labor market is unusual in that it is often considered as being
particularly °exible - In the European case, complementarities between various public policies,
and especially those related to EPL, may well modify the U.S. results (Blanchard et al., 2003a,
and L'Haridon, 2005); (ii) Temporary layo®s are much less common in Europe and other OECD
countries than in the U.S. (OECD, 2002).
To address all of these issues, we consider an economic framework allowing for worker mobility
between ¯rms. Equilibrium unemployment models are, from this standpoint, good candidates
to shed light on the e®ects of EPL reform. Indeed this class of models has proven to be relevant
in taking account of the e®ects of both EPL and permanent layo®s on labor-market dynamics.3
Related Literature: The contributions most closely related to the current paper are Fath
and Fuest (2005), Mongrain et al. (2005) and Cahuc et al. (2004) all of which deal with the
question of experience rating in the presence of miscellaneous labor-market institutions. Fath
et al. (2005) liken severance payments to experience rating in a dynamic e±ciency-wage model
with endogenous worker monitoring and endogenous layo®s. They ¯nd that the introduction of
an experience-rated tax increases employment and welfare in this framework. The mechanism
is simple. An increase in the the degree of experience rating or severance payments lowers
monitoring intensity, as this activity is costly for the ¯rm. However, in contrast to severance
payments, experience rating reduces the payroll tax and does not a®ect worker e®ort since the
layo® tax is not a transfer from the ¯rm to the worker. In a fairly similar setting, Mongrain
and Roberts (2005) show, in a static model where ¯rms o®er private insurance, that with a
high degree of experience rating ¯rms may reduce their severance payments by more than the
level of unemployment bene¯ts, producing a welfare loss for workers. Cahuc and Malherbet
(2004) appeal to a search and matching model to highlight the e®ects of the introduction of an
experience-rated tax in a prototypical European continental labor market with two-tier contracts
(short-term and long-term) as well as other pervasive institutions. They consider a particular
segment of the labor market where unskilled workers are paid the minimum wage. In this context
3See, among others, Millard and Mortensen (1997) and Albrecht and Vroman (1999).
4they ¯nd that the combination of minimum wage, temporary contracts and stringent EPL can
give rise to a form of labor market regulation where experience rating is desirable.
This article is along the lines of the work discussed above. Our analysis stands out from the
e±ciency-wage model proposed by Fath et al. (2005) and Mongrain et al. (2005) by considering
a more general framework with search frictions and by integrating another important EPL
component, i.e. the red tape and legal costs associated with layo®s whose predominance over
severance payments is widely acknowledged in most European countries (See Blanchard, 2000,
and Kramarz and Michaud, 2004, in the particular case of France.). In addition, our work
generalizes the contribution of Cahuc and Malherbet (2004) to a more elaborate framework
where the whole population is considered, wages are freely bargained, and the economy is subject
to macroeconomic shocks. This latter component is introduced insofar as the e®ects of state-
contingent layo® taxes are likely to be more harmful to ¯rms when aggregate conditions are
depressed. In addition, our analysis sheds light on the dynamic e®ect of EPL reform, in contrast
to with previous contributions whose focus was rather on the steady-state.
We speci¯cally provide a search and matching model in the style of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) with the following key ingredients: (i) match-speci¯c heterogeneity meant to re°ect the
quality of the ¯rm-worker relationship; (ii) an aggregate productivity element which captures
changes in the macroeconomic environment; (iii) a series of restrictive EPL mechanisms re°ect-
ing the stringency of employment protection, capturing both the layo® tax and red tape and
legal costs; and (iv) a general wage-setting mechanism which captures the e®ects of both EPL
components on salaries.
The theoretical analysis leads us to argue that a state-contingent layo® tax di®ers signi¯cantly
from the conventional EPL package. The calibration of our model con¯rms that EPL reform
will improve overall labor-market performance, thereby alleviating the unemployment-insurance
budget, increasing production and reducing the aggregate unemployment rate. This latter e®ect
is stronger the worse are aggregate macroeconomic conditions. In addition, time-series analysis
provides strong empirical evidence that state-contingent layo® taxes stabilize labor-market °ows
and employment over the business cycle. The broad conclusion from our analysis is that EPL
reform can give rise to a form of labor-market regulation where the e±ciency of employment
protection is improved, while leaving overall worker security in the labor market una®ected.
The outline of this article is as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework used
to analyze the e®ects of EPL reform. Section 3 discusses the labor-market general-equilibrium
perspective and presents a variety of simulations to assess the e®ects of the reform. Section 4
5concludes.
2 The Model
This section outlines the economic environment in which we analyze the employment e®ects
of EPL reform. The model builds on and extends the continuous-time search and matching
framework developed and surveyed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a,b) and Pissarides (2000).
2.1 Preliminary Assumptions
The assumptions are essentially common to the search and matching literature4 and are therefore
only brie°y sketched unless necessary.
Demography and Preferences: Time is continuous. There are two goods in the economy:
labor, which is the sole input, and a numeraire good which is produced and consumed. The
labor market is populated by a measure one of in¯nitely-lived workers. Each worker supplies
one unit of labor and can be either employed and producing or unemployed and searching. All
agents discount future payo®s at the rate ½ > 0, and are risk neutral. The choice of a linear
utility function is a standard assumption in the search literature and is used in order to keep
the environment as simple as possible.5 This assumption implies that we restrict our analysis
to the employment consequences of EPL reform and thereby skirt any insurance issues which,
although important, are beyond the scope of this paper.6
Macroeconomic Environment and Production: Unlike the standard search and matching
framework, the model here allows for turbulence at the macroeconomic level. We assume that the
aggregate economic environment moves stochastically between n states according to an arbitrary
Markov process with persistence. A transition matrix, ­, whose elements are the instantaneous
transition probabilities from one state to another, is associated with this process. Aggregate
states are indexed by subscript i 2 [1;n] and are ranked in descending order with i = 1 standing
for the best aggregate state.
There is a continuum of small ¯rms, the number of which is endogenous in equilibrium.
Firms have a single job slot and either produce with one worker, or search with an open vacancy.
For a given aggregate state i, each job is endowed with an irreversible production technology
requiring one unit of labor to produce pi + ¾" units of output, where ¾ is an indicator of the
4See Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) for an exhaustive survey.
5Introducing a non-linear utility function into a search and matching model with endogenous job destruction
and bargained wages adds a degree of complexity that we would rather avoid here.
6See, among others, Bertola (2004), Blanchard and Tirole (2008) and Pissarides (2001) for a discussion of the
insurance role of employment protection.
6dispersion in the idiosyncratic component. Productivity is made up of two components: (i) an
aggregate component, pi, which is contingent to the state of nature and common to all jobs;
and (ii) an idiosyncratic component, ¾", which is match-speci¯c. Total productivity is therefore
subject to two sources of uncertainty: (i) a microeconomic or idiosyncratic source; and (ii) a
macroeconomic or aggregate source. The product of a match changes from time to time without
warning. The stochastic process governing the idiosyncratic component of productivity " is
Poisson with arrival rate ¸. In the event of such a shock, a new value of job-speci¯c productivity
is drawn from a cumulative distribution function G(") with support over the range ["l;"u]. Given
an aggregate state i, the existing ¯lled jobs are destroyed only if the new value of " falls below an
endogenous and state-contingent threshold denoted by "di. As a consequence, the rate at which
existing jobs are destroyed follows a Poisson process with parameter ¸G("di). The aggregate
component of productivity pi changes according to the Markov process described above. It is
worth noting that although aggregate shocks do not a®ect job-speci¯c productivity, they do
induce changes in the state-contingent threshold, "di. As a consequence, aggregate turbulence
may lead to the termination of some jobs. The mechanism is described in depth in the core of
the paper.7
Matching: Vacant jobs and unemployed workers are brought together in pairs via an imperfect
matching process. In each state i, this process is captured by an aggregate matching function
M(vi;ui), where vi and ui designate the vacancy and unemployment rates respectively. With this
formulation, only unemployed persons are assumed to be job applicants. In other words, it comes
down to neglecting on the job search activities. The function M(vi;ui) is assumed to be strictly
increasing with respect to each of its arguments and to exhibit constant returns to scale. The
linear homogeneity of the matching function allows us to write the transition rate for vacancies
as M(vi;ui)=vi = M(1;ui=vi) = q(µi), where µi = vi=ui stands for labor-market tightness in
aggregate state i. Similarly, the °ow out of unemployment is given by M(vi;ui)=ui = µiq(µi).
The properties of the matching function imply that q(µi) and µiq(µi) are respectively decreasing
and increasing in labor market tightness. Upon matching, a common start-up productivity level8,
"u, is assumed for all job-worker matches. It follows that all vacancies in a given aggregate state
are identical ex ante and have an associated productivity level of pi + ¾"u.
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL): Any employment relation may be terminated
7See section 2.4 below for the mechanisms driving job destruction.
8This assumption is used for simplicity's sake. Under a stochastic job-matching hypothesis (see Pissarides,
2000 chapter 6) it can be shown that the properties of the model are una®ected. A Technical Appendix is available
from the authors on request.
7once a cost, f +¿ei, is paid by the ¯rm. The ¯rst component of this cost, f, stands for a generic
measure of employment protection and is assumed to capture the red tape and legal costs
associated with layo®s. This assumption is justi¯ed on two grounds. First, in most European
countries, and particularly in France, employment termination takes time and is extremely
costly. Second, termination costs generally vastly exceed severance payments (Blanchard, 2000,
and Kramarz and Michaud, 2004). The parameter f therefore re°ects a state-mandated cost
rather than a transfer from the ¯rm to the worker.9 The second cost component, ¿ei, is a
layo® tax designed to ¯nance the unemployment-compensation system. This tax has the three
following characteristics10: (i) it is a layo® tax and, as a consequence, a®ects the ¯rm's layo®
decisions; (ii) it is used to ¯nance the unemployment bene¯ts paid to unemployed workers and
thereby constitutes a revenue source for the unemployment-compensation system; and (iii) it is
contingent on the state of nature, since the system's funding is indexed on the average length
of unemployment spells. Further details are provided below.
Wage Bargaining: The existence of transaction costs on the labor market gives rise to a local
monopoly rent equal to the di®erence between what the individual obtains in the contractual
job-worker relationship and their best opportunity outside the contract. The match surplus is
divided between the ¯rm and the worker according to a wage rule. Following the bulk of the
search and matching literature, we assume that the surplus is split between the ¯rm and the
worker according to a generalized Nash criterion (see, for instance, Mortensen and Pissarides,
1999a, Pissarides, 2000 and Rogerson et al., 2005). In this framework, bargaining provides each
participant with a share of the surplus which is proportional to her bargaining power, denoted
by ° 2 [0;1]. We assume that wages are renegotiated each time new information regarding
the job-worker match is revealed, which occurs at the Poisson rate ¸. EPL modi¯es the shape
of wage bargaining and implies a two-tier bargaining structure.11 In fact, EPL requires us to
9Our decision not to formalize severance payments is justi¯ed for two reasons. First, as already men-
tioned, severance payments are generally smaller than red tape and legal costs. Second, the classical \bonding
critique" emphasized by Lazear (1990) stipulates that, in the absence of contractual frictions, severance payments
can be canceled out by an appropriate wage contract. Then for the reasons pointed out in Lazear (1990), the
equilibrium values of the key decision variables remain una®ected by severance payments. Since the framework
used here is exempt of contractual frictions this assumption is not restrictive. For more details on the e®ects of
contractual frictions in search and matching models, see Garibaldi and Violante (2005).
10The rationale behind the state-contingent layo® tax, ¿ei, borrows from the experience-rating schemes imple-
mented in the United States. In particular, in the U.S. the experience-rated tax is paid over time rather than at
the time of layo®s or when unemployment bene¯ts are paid out to workers. Such considerations entail a degree
of complexity which we would rather avoid here. Hence, for simplicity's sake, we assume an experience-rating
schedule that has no memory and call it a state-contingent layo® tax. As far as we know, all of the papers
devoted to experience rating have adopted this assumption. The analysis of the dynamic consequences of an
experience-rated system with memory would be an extremely interesting extension to consider in future research.
11Some authors have questioned the plausibility of this two-tier bargaining structure (Lindbeck and Snower,
1988, and McLeod and Malcomson, 1993). Indeed, in the absence of a two-tier agreement, hold-up problems may
arise, and in such cases job creation outcomes are generally di®erent. It may be demonstrated that alternative
8distinguish between wage negotiation upon ¯rst meeting and wage renegotiation. EPL applies
and is binding in the latter case but not in the former, since no contract has yet been signed. As
noted by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a), this dual structure is similar to the insider-outsider
con°ict described by Lindbeck and Snower (1988) where the outsiders (the unemployed workers)
do not pro¯t from EPL whereas the insiders (the employed workers) use it to strengthen their
negotiating position.
2.2 Values
A job can be in one of the three following states: vacant, recently ¯lled or continuing. Each
of these states has a corresponding asset value ¦vi for a ¯rm with a vacancy, ¦oi for a ¯rm
matched with an outsider, and ¦ei for a ¯rm matched with an insider. A vacant job costs h per
unit of time. Let q(µi) and ­ij denote the respective transition rates for ¯lling a vacancy and
for switching from aggregate state i to state j. The asset value of a vacancy in state i is such
that:







;8i;j = 1:::n; (1)
where ¦oi("u) is the expected value of a new job at the upper bound of the productivity dis-
tribution. This equation simply states that the ¯rm pays a °ow cost, h, realizes a capital gain,
[¦oi("u) ¡ ¦vi], at the time of recruitment, and takes account of the possible changes at Poisson
rate ­ij in aggregate conditions. EPL implies a two-tier agreement which requires us to distin-
guish between the asset value of newly-created and continuing jobs. The value of a new match
to the employer in state i is thus:
½¦oi("u) = pi + ¾"u ¡ woi("u) ¡ ¿i
+ ¸
·Z









;8i;j = 1:::n; (2)
where woi("u) is the wage paid to outsiders and ¿i is a lump-sum payroll tax. The equity value of
the ¯rm in state i is equal to the instantaneous °ow pro¯t, pi+¾"u¡woi("u)¡¿i, plus the ¯rm's
anticipation of capital change due to either a speci¯c or an aggregate shock. In the event of a
speci¯c shock, the ¯rm retains the option of ¯ring the worker if the new value of productivity
is below the reservation threshold, "di. In this case the ¯rm bears the dismissal costs of ¿ei +f.
wage speci¯cations do not alter the results of our model. For instance under a pure insider model it can be shown
that the qualitative results remain unchanged. We hence restrict ourselves to the main e®ect of the reform using
the standard speci¯cation (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999a, for a discussion of rent sharing with turnover
costs).
9Note that in the event of an aggregate shock which a®ects the equity value, the job is never
destroyed since it remains at the upper bound, "u, of the productivity distribution. Finally, the
value to the employer of continuing the match in state i is:
½¦ei(") = pi + ¾" ¡ wi(") ¡ ¿i
+ ¸
·Z













;8i;j = 1:::n; (3)
where wi(") is the wage paid to insiders at productivity ". Here however, unlike the case in
equation (2), shifts in aggregate conditions may lead to job termination, producing the Max
operator in the last term of (3). Although aggregate shocks do not a®ect the idiosyncratic com-
ponent of productivity, they do induce shifts in the endogenous and state-contingent thresholds.
In the case of an adverse shock, an increase in these thresholds may lead to the termination of
some job-worker matches since " can potentially take any value over the range ["l; "u]:12
A worker can be in one of the three following states: unemployed, recently hired or tenured.
Each of these states has a corresponding asset value denoted by Vui for unemployment, Voi
for a recently-hired outsider, and Vei for a tenured insider. The expected utility stream of a
recently-hired worker in state i is given by:







;8i;j = 1:::n; (4)
where b denotes unemployment bene¯ts. This equation states that unemployed workers ¯nd a
job at Poisson rate µiq(µi), realize capital gains of [Voi("u) ¡ Vui] at the time of recruitment,
and take into account at Poisson rate ­ij the possible changes in aggregate conditions. As
previously, EPL requires that we distinguish between the expected utility streams of recently-
hired and tenured workers. The initial value of the match to a worker in state i is:











;8i;j = 1:::n: (5)
A new worker is paid the outsider wage, woi("u), and expects microeconomic and macroeconomic
conditions to change with respective Poisson rates ¸ and ­ij. Finally, the value of continuing
12Section 2.4 below describes the mechanisms driving job destruction.
10the match to the worker in state i is given by:











¡ Vei(")];8i;j = 1:::n: (6)
A tenured worker is paid the insider wage, wi("). The same types of shocks are likely to occur
and a®ect the worker's utility from a tenured match on the labor market. However both sources
of turbulence may now produce job terminations, yielding the Max operator in the last term of
(6).
2.3 Surplus, Exit, Entry and Wages
Surplus: Matches yield a surplus which is equal to the sum of the expected present value of
the job to the worker and the employer net of the value of searching for an alternative partner.
To derive the key equations necessary to solve the model, it is convenient to de¯ne the surplus
associated with a job-worker pair. EPL and the related two-tier bargaining structure imply two
di®erent de¯nitions of the surplus, depending on whether we consider new matches (during an
early negotiation stage) or continuing matches (during a renegotiation stage). Let Soi("u) and
Sei(") be the surplus of new and continuing matches respectively. At the time of recruitment
breaking o® bargaining entails no separation costs for the ¯rm since no contract has yet been
signed. Hence, the surplus of a new match to the job-worker pair contingent on aggregate state
i is:
Soi("u) = Voi("u) ¡ Vui + ¦oi(") ¡ ¦vi: (7)
When the worker and the employer clinch a bargain, separation costs take e®ect if the negotiation
fails. As a result, the surplus of a continuing match to the job-worker pair, contingent on
aggregate state i, is:
Sei(") = Vei(") ¡ Vui + ¦ei(") ¡ ¦vi + f + ¿ei; (8)
where f + ¿ei represent the costs paid by the ¯rm in the case of separation.
Exit and Entry: The formal condition for proceeding with a match is Sei(") ¸ 0. Severance
between the employer and the employee | job destruction| occurs as soon as idiosyncratic
productivity " falls below a certain threshold "di, after which the surplus becomes negative. The
formal condition for severance is:
Sei("di) = 0; (9)
11which implicitly de¯nes "di as the minimum idiosyncratic productivity level required to ensure
the match's pro¯tability. Job creation is governed by free entry in the matching market. Free
entry implies the exhaustion of all rents, and drives the value of holding a vacancy to zero. This
latter condition is given by:
¦vi = 0: (10)
Wages: Bargaining leads to a surplus-sharing rule µ a la Nash providing a share ° 2 [0;1] of
the surplus to the worker; this can be interpreted as her bargaining power. In the ¯rst stage
of the negotiation, as separation costs remain virtual, the Nash sharing rule for outsiders is
(1 ¡ °)[Voi("u) ¡ Vui] = ° [¦oi("u) ¡ ¦vi]; in the second stage, where the separation costs take
e®ect, the Nash sharing rule for insiders is (1 ¡ °)[Vei(") ¡ Vui] = ° [¦ei(") ¡ (¦vi ¡ f ¡ ¿ei)].
Since EPL improves the threat point of the worker, the bargain yields a two-tier wage agreement
denoted by woi("u) and wi("), given by:13
woi("u) = (1 ¡ °)b + ° [pi + ¾"u ¡ ¿i + hµi ¡ ¸(f + ¿ei)]; (11)
wi(") = (1 ¡ °)b + °
2









It is worth noting that EPL produces a gap between insiders' and outsiders' wages. The ex-
planation is intuitive. On the ¯rst tier, outsiders are prepared to concede a wage-cut in order
to bene¯t from EPL later on, hence the negative term, ¡¸(f + ¿ei), in (11). Conversely, on
the second tier, insiders use EPL to capture a greater part of the rent, hence the positive term,
½(f + ¿ei), in (12). These two e®ects are nevertheless common to the majority of EPL models
with °exible wage-setting. More interestingly, wages appear to take into account the change in
the layo® tax with aggregate conditions. Thus the second EPL component contrasts strongly
with the ¯rst one |f in our model| in the sense that the layo® tax is state-contingent.
2.4 Creation and Destruction of Job-Worker Matches
Using the entry and exit conditions, and the de¯nitions of the surplus, we derive the two key
relationships required to de¯ne the equilibrium. These will be referred to hereafter as the job
creation and job destruction conditions.14
Job Destruction: Separation between the worker and the ¯rm takes place as soon as the rent
from the match drops to zero. The formal condition is given by the exit condition (9). Some
13See Appendix 1 for the details of these calculations.
14See Appendix 2 for details of these calculations.
12algebra yields the job destruction condition for state of nature i. The job destruction threshold
is written as:
pi + ¾"di = b +
µi°h
1 ¡ °
















max[Sei(³);0]dG(³) stands for the expected value of the surplus in aggregate
state i. The RHS of (13) shows that reservation productivity depends on the opportunity cost
of employment, b+µi°h=(1¡°)+¿i, which is the sum of unemployment bene¯ts, the expected
value of search and the lump-sum payroll tax. Layo®s are in°uenced by both aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks. In both cases, as soon as the surplus of a job-worker match is non-positive,
there is no incentive to pursue the employment relationship. The job-worker match is subject
to two sources of productivity shocks (idiosyncratic and aggregate).
The ¯gure below illustrates how job destruction works in our framework. The cuto® pro-
ductivities, "di;8i = 1:::n, are ranked in descending order, where subscript 1 stands for the best
aggregate state and subscript n for the worst.
-
"l "d1 "d2 "d3 "dn¡1 "dn "u
Figure 1: Reservation (cuto®) productivities contingent on aggregate state i, 8i = 1:::n.
A job-worker match is destroyed for one of two reasons. First, at given aggregate productivity,
there are idiosyncratic shocks. Job-speci¯c productivity changes at a Poisson rate of ¸, in
which case the ¯rm compares the option value of dissolving the match to the value of pursuing
the employment relationship. In the event of such a shock a new value of the job-speci¯c
productivity is drawn from the general distribution G. According to the current endogenous
productivity threshold, "di, the job is destroyed if the new value of productivity is below this
cuto® productivity. This is the usual microeconomic (¯rm-speci¯c) source of job destruction.
Second, at a given idiosyncratic productivity level, there are aggregate shocks. A change in
macroeconomic conditions causes cuto® productivity to shift up (in the case of an adverse
shock) or down (in the case of a good shock). In other words, a positive shock unveils a new
range of productive jobs (say from "dn to "dn¡1) whereas an adverse shock retires an old range
13of previously productive jobs (say from "dn¡1 to "dn). This is the macroeconomic (economy-
wide) source of job destruction. More accurately, following an adverse aggregate shock, the
expected pro¯t associated with any job-worker match falls. Firms become pickier and, as a
consequence, the destruction threshold moves up, leading to an increase in the job destruction
rate. Conversely, following a positive aggregate shock, the pro¯t associated with any job-worker
match increases. Firms become less demanding and consequently the destruction threshold
shifts downwards, leading to a decrease in job destruction.
It is also worth remarking from equation (13) that reservation productivity is lower than the
opportunity cost of employment. This phenomenon stems from labor hoarding. In our frame-
work there are four natural sources of labor hoarding. First, at the microeconomic level (for a
given aggregate state), there are two sources of retention. First, an institutional source captured
by the term, ½(¿ei+f), representing the capitalized value of dismissal costs which induces ¯rms to
reduce the productivity threshold and retain more workers. The state-contingent layo® tax has
a direct standard EPL e®ect by enhancing this institutional source of labor hoarding. Up to this
point the layo® tax behaves exactly as a standard EPL component. Second, a voluntary source
captured by the term ¸E(Sei), corresponding to the option value of maintaining a job-worker
match due to the expected change in idiosyncratic productivity ". In addition, our framework
encompasses two macroeconomic sources of labor hoarding. First, an institutional source cap-
tured by the term
Pn
i6=j ­ij(¿ei ¡¿ej), underlining that the layo® tax is state-contingent. Hence,
an expected increase in these costs gives ¯rms an incentive to terminate more jobs in the cur-









, indicating expected labor hoarding following a shift in
aggregate conditions.
At this stage, it is important to remark that this aggregate voluntary source of labor hoarding
is asymmetric between states. Two polar cases illustrate this point. First assume that the
economy is in the best aggregate state. Here aggregate conditions can only worsen, leading
to an increase in the productivity threshold. Job-worker matches with a current productivity





. Second, assume that the economy is in the worst aggregate
state. Here aggregate conditions can only improve, leading to a decrease in the productivity
threshold. Hence all job-workers matches are preserved and are expected to yield greater surplus
as aggregate conditions shift. It follows that the fourth labor hoarding component is greater the
worse are aggregate conditions.
14Job Creation: Firms enter the labor market until all pro¯t opportunities from new jobs have
been exploited. In equilibrium, the rents from vacant jobs are zero and satisfy the free-entry
condition (10). Some algebra produces the job creation condition for state of nature i. This
condition which de¯nes labor-market tightness is written as:
h(½ + ¸)
q(µi)
= (1 ¡ °)
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This equation simply states that the expected value of search cost has to equal the expected
pro¯t of a new job to the ¯rm. The LHS of (14) represents the expected capitalized value of
the ¯rm's hiring cost in the current state. This cost increases in labor market tightness, µi,
as the higher is market tightness, the longer the time it takes to ¯ll a vacancy. The RHS of
(14) stands for the expected pro¯t of a vacant job. This expected pro¯t decreases in labor
market tightness because the utility of the unemployed increases in labor market tightness. In
other words market tightness improves workers' outside opportunities and translates into higher
reservation wages. The RHS of (14) can be divided into four terms: (i) the net instantaneous
°ow pro¯t, pi+¾"u¡¿i¡b¡
µi°h
1¡° ; (ii) the expected loss to the ¯rm due to contract renegotiation
following an idiosyncratic productivity shock, ¸(¿ei + f);15 (iii) the option value of retaining a










2.5 Balanced-Budget Rule and Fiscality
Budget Rule: To close the model, we need to connect unemployment bene¯ts to their ¯nanc-
ing. For solvency reasons, the government needs to respect a balanced-budget rule and cannot
independently set unemployment bene¯ts and the taxes required to ¯nance them. Accordingly,
the level of unemployment bene¯ts is exogenous whereas the taxes collected to ¯nance unem-
ployment insurance are endogenous and ensure a balanced budget in each aggregate state.16
Unemployment bene¯ts are ¯nanced by two instruments: a lump sum payroll tax ¿i paid on
each ¯lled job, and a tax paid each time a job is destroyed, denoted by ¿ei. This second tax is
introduced in order to take the budgetary e®ects of the state-contingent layo® tax into account.
The coverage of the layo® tax is said to be complete or perfect when ¿i = 0, i.e. when the ¯rm
supports the entire cost of the expenditure created via its ¯ring decisions. Conversely, the tax
15Note that the state-contingent layo® tax in increasing the contract renegotiation cost behaves in a standard
EPL way, hence lowering job creation
16An alternative speci¯cation of the budget rule is considered in Section 3.3.
15is said to be perfectly incomplete or imperfect when ¿ei is nil, i.e. unemployment bene¯ts are
exclusively ¯nanced through the lump-sum payroll tax. It is important to note that this latter
case is consistent with the ¯nancing of unemployment bene¯ts in almost all OECD countries.
In all other cases, the layo® tax is said to be incomplete. The balanced-budget rule implies:
(1 ¡ ui)¿i + (1 ¡ ui)¸G("di)¿ei = uib; (15)
where uib denotes (endogenous) expenditures on unemployment compensation. Resources are
equal to the sum of the payroll tax (1¡ui)¿i | the mutualized part of unemployment bene¯ts|
and the layo® tax (1 ¡ ui)¸G("di)¿ei. This last term depends on the job-destruction rate.
Accordingly, the greater are layo®s, the higher is the ¯rm's contribution to the ¯nancing system.




b ¡ ¸G("di)¿ei: (16)
One crucial property of the above is that ¿i is decreasing in ¿ei. The state-contingent layo®
tax makes ¯rms partly defray the ¯scal costs they produce through their ¯ring decisions. Any
increase in the layo® tax makes ¯rms directly bear a greater part of this ¯scal cost. Consequently,
the mutualized part of the ¯scal cost falls with the layo® tax. The layo® tax thus has a ¯scal
impact which is absent from the usual EPL programmes. The introduction of a layo® tax
tightens the strictness of EPL but at the same time reduces the mutualized part of unemployment
bene¯ts and the lump-sum payroll tax. It follows that this fall in the payroll tax will increase
the pro¯tability of any job.
State-contingent layo® tax: In the event of separation, the tax incurred by the ¯rm is
determined according to a ¯scal-cost criterion. The ¯scal cost of an unemployed worker, Ci, is
given by the following arbitrage equation:
½Ci = b + µiq(µi)[0 ¡ Ci] +
n X
i6=j
­ij [Cj ¡ Ci]; (17)
where Ci is the expected ¯scal cost. An unemployed worker receives instantaneous income of b
and returns to employment with a transition rate µiq(µi). When she returns to employment, her
¯scal cost to the unemployment compensation system is zero. In addition, note that this cost
will likely change with aggregate conditions. Let e 2 [0;1] be an index of the coverage of the
layo® tax, i.e. the percentage of the expected ¯scal cost that is directly borne by the ¯rm at
the time of the layo®. We will refer to this equivalently as the degree or the index of the layo®
16tax in the reminder of the paper. It follows that the state-contingent layo® tax incurred by the









In partial equilibrium, it is henceforth possible to establish the following properties for the layo®
tax de¯ned by (18):
² (i) The layo® tax increases in unemployment bene¯ts, b. The higher are unemployment
bene¯ts the higher is the overall cost of a worker on the dole to the ¯rm for any positive
value of the index;
² (ii) The layo® tax increases in the layo®-tax index, e. A higher value of this index lowers
the mutualized part of unemployment bene¯ts and therefore raises the cost incurred by
the ¯rm;
² (iii) The layo® tax decreases in labor-market tightness, µi. Greater labor-market tight-
ness increases the exit rate from unemployment and consequently shortens unemployment
spells. As a result, the expected ¯scal cost is smaller, hence so is the cost borne by the
¯rm.
It is worth remarking that all of the above properties are characteristic of the U.S. experience-
rating system. The major di®erence between our state-contingent layo® tax and such a system
is that in an experience-rated system, the tax is paid over time rather than at the time of the
layo®.
It is also important to note that, contrary to ¯ring costs, the layo® tax is state-contingent,
being higher the poorer are aggregate conditions. A rise in the layo®-tax index then translates
into a fall in payroll tax that will be all the more pronounced the better are aggregate conditions.
It follows that as the layo®-tax index rises, the balanced-budget rule induces a smoothing e®ect
of the same type that a constant payroll tax over the business cycle would have generated.
2.6 Flow Equilibrium
Given the aggregate state i, labor market tightness, µi, and the productivity threshold, "di, the
equilibrium unemployment rate, ui, evolves as a function of the job destruction rate ¸G("di)
and the exit rate from unemployment µiq (µi). The law of motion of unemployment in the labor
market in state i satis¯es:
dui
dt
= ¸G("di)(1 ¡ ui) ¡ µiq(µi)ui: (19)
17Equation (19) is the key to understanding the behavior of unemployment when the economy
is in state i. When the economy is hit by an aggregate shock, labor-market tightness, µi, and
the productivity threshold, "di, jump to their new values and the unemployment rate adjusts
consequently.
If the aggregate component of productivity, pi, repeatedly takes on the same value, the
economy converges to a state with constant unemployment. In line with Cole and Rogerson
(1999), if we assume a long sequence of such aggregate productivity shocks, the stationary






This last equation is only valid in the steady state in the absence of any aggregate turbulence.
It expresses the equilibrium of worker °ows between employment and unemployment, given
the properties of the matching function, and yields the Beveridge curve. It is decreasing in
labor-market tightness and increasing in reservation productivity.
2.7 Equilibrium
De¯nition: In each state equilibrium for a given labor market policy (e;f) is de¯ned by a
n-tuple ("di, µi, ¿i, ¿ei, ui) composed of reservation productivity, labor-market tightness, the
payroll tax, the state-contingent layo® tax and the equilibrium unemployment rate. This vector
solves the set of equations de¯ned by (13), (14), (16), (18) and (20). Formally the system is as
follows:
(i) Reservation Productivity
pi + ¾"di = b + µi
°
1 ¡ °

















= (1 ¡ °)
·
pi + ¾"u ¡ ¿i ¡ b ¡ µi
°
1 ¡ °


















b ¡ ¸G("di)¿ei; (23)









(v) The Law of Motion of Unemployment
dui
dt
= ¸G("di)(1 ¡ ui) ¡ µiq(µi)ui: (25)
This system de¯nes the equilibrium key values in each aggregate state i. The model consists of
5n non-linear equations to be jointly solved to compute the equilibrium. Given its complexity
the model cannot be solved analytically under its general form, hence the necessity to turn to
numerical simulations.17
3 A General Equilibrium Perspective
3.1 The Benchmark Economy and Calibration
To derive quantitative conclusions, the model needs to be calibrated. The data parameters
and moments used in the calibration refer to the French economy. The period is the quarter
and the discount rate, ½, is set to 1%. A Cobb-Douglas matching function is assumed such that
M(ui;vi) = ku®
i v1¡®
i , where k is a mismatch parameter and ® and 1¡® are the elasticities of the
matching function with respect to search inputs. We assume ® to be equal to 0:5, which is in the
range of the estimates obtained by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), and more speci¯cally Fµ eve
and Langot (1996) for the French labor market. We assume equal bargaining power between
¯rms and workers. The distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is assumed to be uniform over the
support ["l;"u]. Following Gomes et al. (2001) the properties of the aggregate technology shock
are summarized by a three-point Markov chain on the set (p1; p2; p3) where the state-to-state
transition probabilities ­ij;8i; j = 1;2;3 are ranked in the matrix ­. This chain is chosen
to approximate an autoregressive (AR) process of the form yt = Áyt¡1 + Àt, where Á and À
respectively refer to the autocorrelation coe±cient and the standard error of the innovation.
Using French data over the period 1970-1996, Karam¶ e (2000) estimated these parameters as
Á = 0:94 and À = 0:007: The vector of aggregate productivity components (p1;p2;p3) is set to
match the mean and variance of the underlying AR process. Assuming that it is impossible to
17In addition, the model may exhibit multiple equilibria. As pointed out by Rocheteau (1999), the existence
of multiple equilibria is a generic property of search and matching economies with balanced-budget rules. As a
consequence, we cannot rule out here the occurrence of such equilibria. However, we argue that this not a problem
since the government is able (through proper ¯scal instruments) to choose the low-unemployment equilibrium and
therefore to avoid any pathological equilibria.





















The vector of aggregate productivity components associated with this matrix satis¯es (p1;p2;p3) =
(0:0355;0;¡0:0355), where the subscripts 1;2 and 3 stand for the high, median and low aggre-
gate states respectively. The idiosyncratic dispersion indicator ¾ is set so as to reproduce a
relative variance between the aggregate and the idiosyncratic shocks in the range previously
found by Karam¶ e (2000) on French data and Den Haan et al. (2000) and Gomes et al. (2001)
on U.S. data. The key feature is that the contribution of idiosyncratic productivity to total
productivity variation is much more important than the contribution of aggregate productivity
(Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999).
Since there is no state-contingent layo® tax in the French labor market, the index, e, is set to
zero in the benchmark economy. The level of the red tape and legal costs, f, is set to represent
50% of the average annual wage in the steady state. This level is consistent with the ¯ndings
of French empirical studies described, for instance, by Kramarz et al. (2004). Unemployment
bene¯ts are set to 60% of the average long-term wage, which is in the range of OECD estimates.
The remaining free parameters, k, ¸ and h are chosen in order to match key characteristics
of the French labor market. Speci¯cally, the scale parameter k and the cost of vacant jobs h
are set to yield a mean unemployment rate of 10:6% and to be consistent with the average cost
of posting a vacancy as documented by Kramarz et al. (2004). From an empirical point of
view, it is di±cult to disentangle the arrival shocks rate ¸ from the reservation productivity
"di. Accordingly, ¸ is calibrated so as to represent an average job destruction rate of 5:5% per
quarter, in the range of values reported by Duhautois (2002). The parameter values used in the
computations are summarized in Table 1.
Variable Notation Value Variable Notation Value
Matching elasticity ® 0:5 Mismatch parameter k 1
Bargaining power ° 0:5 Discount rate ½ 0:01
Dispersion indicator ¾ 0:3637 Vacancy cost h 0:37
Shock arrival rate ¸ 0:8 Firing cost f 0:572
Autocorrelation coe±cient Á 0:94 Unemployment bene¯ts b 0:1716
Innovation À 0:007 Layo® tax index e 0
Table 1: Baseline Parameters for the French Labor Market.
203.2 Employment Protection Reform
Methodology: In order to assess the properties of the state-contingent layo® tax, we consider
the e®ects of an EPL reform which consists of a perfect substitution between the ¯ring cost, f,
and the state-contingent layo® tax, ¿ei. This substitution implies the same ex post long-term
degree of employment protection in the median aggregate productivity state. Formally, the
vector of policies that satis¯es this substitution is given by (¿e = 0:2; f = 0:372; e = 0:6540):18
In order to gauge the e®ect of the reform, three criteria are used: the unemployment rate,
production and the budget size (as a percentage of total production). We focus on dynamic
analysis so as to shed light on the cyclical properties of EPL reform. To this end we use the
laws of motion of the key labor market variables (see the Appendix), to build time series for
each variable, and calculate the relevant statistics, namely the mean, the standard deviation and
the correlation coe±cient. To obtain these statistics19 we simulate the model for 500 periods
and discard the ¯rst 100 observations to avoid problems pertaining to initial dependance. The
remaining 400 observations are then logged and ¯ltered using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter. We
repeat this procedure 100 times and compute averages over the 100 samples.20
Cyclical Properties: As a preamble, and before inspecting the e®ects of the reform, we present
the main cyclical properties of the French labor market, as well as the simulated equivalents, in
order to assess the capacity of the model to ¯t the data. Table 2 summarizes the results. While






Table 2: Main cyclical properties of the French labor market: comparison to the benchmark
economy. Sources: Duhautois (2002), Karam¶ e (2000) and authors' calculations.
the cyclical properties of the benchmark economy ¯t the French data as reported by Karam¶ e
(2000) and Duhautois (2002) fairly well, we may be puzzled by the low correlation between u and
v in the case of the benchmark economy, which is far removed from the corresponding ¯gure for
the U.S.. economy.21 It should be noted that the empirical correlation between the two variables
is in fact much lower in France than in the U.S. Even so, some discrepancy remains between
18This number is in the range of the average experience-rating index in the U.S. economy over 1988 ¡ 1997
(UIPL, 1999) and is therefore deemed to be realistic.
19In the remainder of the paper x and ¾x stand respectively for the mean and the standard deviation of x.
20It is worth noting that the qualitative results of the model, and particularly the cyclical properties, do not
depend on this procedure.
21We are grateful to an associate editor for pointing out this fact.
21the two correlations (u;v), as indicated in the last row of Table 2. This echoes an ongoing and
lively debate over the capacity of the search and matching framework to replicate the cyclical
behavior of unemployment and vacancies in the U.S. This debate originated in an in°uential
paper by Shimer (2005), giving rise to what Pissarides (2007) has called the \unemployment
volatility puzzle"22. While this debate is fascinating, it remains beyond the scope of the current
paper for two reasons: (i) the volatility puzzle seems somewhat less important in the French
labor market; and (ii) the focus of this paper is on the variation in rather than the level of the
model's cyclical properties induced by EPL reform.
EPL Reform: Tables 3 and 4 present the main results of our numerical simulations. The ¯rst
part of Table 3 shows the e®ects of the reform over the business cycle on the means of the relevant
variables (namely job creation, job destruction, the unemployment rate and production), whereas
the second part presents the standard deviations. Table 4 focuses on the e®ects of reform on the
unemployment rate and budget size for each aggregate state. From Table 3, it is evident that, on
Benchmark EPL Reform Benchmark EPL Reform
JC 5:4908 5:4742 ¾JC 0:2176 0:1735
JD 5:4903 5:4738 ¾JD 0:2491 0:1359
u 10:6951 10:0450 ¾u 0:5480 0:3966
Y 28:1615 29:0954 ¾Y 1:4336 1:2812
Table 3: Simulation Statistics for 100 series of 400 quarters. Means and standard deviations for
job creation, job destruction, the unemployment rate and production. The data are logged and
HP ¯ltered.
average, the reform reduces both job creation and job destruction. The unemployment rate also
unambiguously falls by about 0:65 percentage points. It follows that the fall in unemployment
leads to a stabilization of budget size (see Table 4), an indicator of unemployment bene¯t ¯nance.
It is also worth remarking that production increases slightly, which we can impute to the fact
that we have substituted a resource-maintaining policy (a tax to ¯nance the UI system) for a
resource-destroying policy (a pure administrative ¯ring cost). We return to this issue in the last
part of the paper. Table 4 o®ers further insights by disentangling the e®ects of the reform by
aggregate state. For each aggregate state, both the unemployment rate and the budget (as a
percentage of production) fall. Hence, the results underlined in the previous table are not only
valid on average but also in each aggregate state. In addition, Table 4 allows us to infer the
cyclical properties of the reform. As can be seen in the last column, the e®ects of the reform
are more pronounced in worse aggregate conditions.
22Recent contributions have tried to solve this puzzle to make the model ¯t the U.S. data better. To name but
a few, see Hall and Milgrom (2008), Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) and Yashiv (2006).
22Variable State Benchmark EPL Reform Net Variation
High 9:10% 8:80% ¡0:30
Unemployment Median 10:57% 9:96% ¡0:61
Low 12:75% 11:58% ¡1:17
High 4:97% 4:65% ¡0:32
Budget Median 6:57% 5:94% ¡0:63
Low 8:09% 7:33% ¡0:76
Table 4: Simulation Statistics for 100 series of 400 quarters. Mean unemployment rate and
mean budget size (in percentage of the production) for each aggregate state.
We can now be more speci¯c about how the state-contingent layo® tax works in this model.
The tax has two e®ects on job creation and job destruction: (i) a standard EPL e®ect; and (ii)
a ¯scal e®ect. The ¯rst e®ect acts exactly as an EPL device. A higher tax increases turnover
costs, promoting labor hoarding. As a result, the job destruction rate falls. At the same time,
the expected pro¯ts on new jobs fall. It follows that job creation is also reduced. Hence, with
the reform the two EPL components o®set each other on average. There is however a ¯scal
counterpart to the layo® tax |the ¯scal e®ect| as the tax serves to ¯nance unemployment
insurance. It follows that the layo® tax reduces the share of unemployment bene¯ts whose
¯nancing is mutualized, since ¿i decreases in ¿ei. The cost of labor is therefore lower, the pro¯t
associated with any job higher, and so the ¯scal e®ect unveils a new range of productive matches.
The layo® tax brings about a sharper decrease in the productivity threshold than do ¯ring costs,
and consequently an additional degree of labor hoarding.
The overall e®ect of the layo® tax results from the combination of these two channels.
The cyclical dependence of EPL has multiple consequences for both job destruction and job
creation (see equations 13 and 14). An increase in the layo® tax index induces changes in the
¯scal components, ¿e and ¿, which are all the more pronounced in a depressed macroeconomic
environment. It follows that ¯rms retain more workers towards the bottom of the cycle. Put
di®erently, the fall in reservation productivity is greater the worse are aggregate conditions. The
overall e®ect of an increase in the index on job creation is a little more tedious to draw out since
both ¯scal variables have contradictory e®ects on tightness. Our numerical experimentations
do allow us however to show that for reasonable parameter values the |favorable| ¯scal e®ect
outweighs the |adverse| EPL e®ect in each aggregate state. Further, the net e®ect on tightness
is more pronounced in depressions. In other words, the elasticity of job creation to the state-
contingent layo® tax is lower than the elasticity of job creation to the payroll tax, and this gap
is larger in worse macroeconomic conditions. Finally, taking the e®ects of the tax on both job
destruction and job creation into account, the unemployment rate falls in all states, and more
23so in worse aggregate conditions. It is important to note that this result has been shown to be
robust to several di®erent model speci¯cations.
The mechanisms we discussed above are consistent with the result presented in the second
part of Table 3. Looking back to the latter, it is evident that EPL reform tends to lower
the standard deviation of both job creation, ¾JC, and job destruction, ¾JD. In other words,
the state-contingent layo® tax tends to reduce the variability of job °ows and consequently to
stabilize the labor market. The key result of this table relates however to the connection between
the state-contingent layo® tax and aggregate employment °uctuations. Table 3 shows that EPL
reform reduces aggregate employment variability by about 25% (¾u drops from 0:55 to 0:40).
The layo® tax acts therefore as a strong employment stabilizer. It is also worth remarking that
the standard deviation of production also falls, although to a smaller extent (¾Y drops from 1:43
to 1:28).
The results thus support a state-contingent layo® tax and refute the assertion that such a
system (which borrows from the U.S. experience-rating system) acts exactly as a common EPL
device. It is also worth noting that our results corroborate and extend the steady-state analysis
in Cahuc et al. (2004) to a general dynamic framework with macroeconomic turbulence.
3.3 Robustness and Discussion
To further highlight the e®ects of the reform, we now discuss in more depth some issues relative
to the robustness23 of the model. Speci¯cally, we pay particular attention to alternative speci¯-
cations of the balanced-budget rule as well as to the manner in which ¯ring costs (red tape and
legal costs) a®ect the economy.
Fiscality: In the core of the paper, unemployment insurance is balanced in each aggregate state.
Alternatively, we may consider the case where the government chooses to adjust the payroll tax
on average over the business cycle. This point is important, since the tax may then serve as
an instrument to smooth employment. Under this speci¯cation, payroll taxes tend to be lower
than the adjusted payroll tax in bad aggregate states and higher in good aggregate states, hence
smoothing employment over the cycle. The simulation results for this speci¯cation are presented
in Table 5.
The results appear to be robust to this speci¯cation. Comparing Tables 3 and 5, we see that
23The results of the model appear to be robust to a wide range of speci¯cations. Besides the issues raised
here, we have considered alternative numerical exercises (not reported here for space considerations) notably by
increasing the layo®-tax index (for a constant value of the ¯ring costs, f) from e = 0 |the benchmark value|
to e = 0:65 |the average value in the previous simulations, and by iterating the degree of persistency, Á, of
the aggregate shocks over the plausible range Á 2 [0:91;0:97]. The qualitative results of the model remain valid
whatever the speci¯cation. The results are available upon request from the authors.
24Benchmark EPL Reform Benchmark EPL Reform
JC 5:4877 5:4737 ¾JC 0:1944 0:1667
JD 5:4872 5:4734 ¾JD 0:2265 0:1317
u 10:6558 10:0358 ¾u 0:4881 0:3812
Y 28:1450 29:0921 ¾Y 1:3616 1:2595
Table 5: Balanced-budget and constant payroll taxes over the business cycle. Simulation Sta-
tistics for 100 series of 400 quarters. Mean and standard deviation for the job creation, job
destruction, the unemployment rate and production. The data are logged and HP ¯ltered.
the volatility of unemployment falls from 0:54 to 0:48 in the benchmark case while the average
unemployment rate remains constant. A constant payroll tax may be seen as a more natural
way in which to smooth employment. However, the results in Tables 3 and 5 suggest that
this e®ect is greater under the EPL reform whatever the balanced-budget rule. In fact the
standard deviation of unemployment is about 0:38 under both speci¯cations, while the average
unemployment rate is signi¯cantly lower. Finally, we conclude that the model results remain
whatever the balanced-budget rule, hence proving that the state-contingent layo® tax is a strong
smoothing instrument.
Firing Costs: Until now we have supposed that ¯ring costs are real resource costs reducing
overall production in the economy. This hypothesis introduces an asymmetry between the
benchmark case and the EPL reform,24 since the state-contingent layo® tax serves as a means of
¯nancing the UI system, i.e. the reform substitutes a resource-maintaining policy for a resource-
destroying policy. It follows that the EPL reform will necessarily increase production due to
the ¯scal e®ect depicted previously. In order to ¯lter out the ¯scal e®ect, we now suppose that
the red tape and legal costs also serve as a means of ¯nancing the UI system.25 As a result
the only remaining di®erence between the benchmark case and the EPL reform pertains to the
state-contingency of the layo® tax. Table 6 provides the simulation results when the asymmetry
between the benchmark case and the EPL reform is dropped. The comparison of Tables 3 and
6 shows that the ¯scal counterpart of layo® taxes has a strong impact on unemployment and
production. The former drops from 10:69% to 9:17% while the latter increases from 28:16 to
30:94. It follows that the fall in the unemployment rate observed in Table 3 is essentially due to
the ¯scal e®ect, i.e. to the substitution of a resource-destroying policy by a resource-maintaining
policy. Hence, a reform which substitutes a constant layo® tax for a state-contingent layo® tax
has no signi¯cant impact on employment (in Table 6, mean unemployment only falls by about
24We are grateful to a referee for pointing out this important issue.
25Note that this speci¯cation is only illustrative, and has no general counterpart in the real world, since red
tape and legal costs are usually dissipated. See Blanchard (2000) and Kramarz et al. (2004) for details.
25Benchmark EPL Reform Benchmark EPL Reform
JC 5:4672 5:4599 ¾JC 0:1753 0:1500
JD 5:4668 5:4596 ¾JD 0:2145 0:1384
u 9:1718 9:1549 ¾u 0:3908 0:3286
Y 30:9410 30:8982 ¾Y 1:2480 1:2234
Table 6: Firing costs (red tape and legal costs) as a means of ¯nancing the UI system. Simulation
Statistics for 100 series of 400 quarters. Mean and standard deviation for the job creation, job
destruction, the unemployment rate and production. The data are logged and HP ¯ltered.
0:02 percentage points). While, under this speci¯cation, there are no signi¯cant reform e®ects on
the means, the cyclical properties of the relevant variables are still a®ected. In particular, from
Table 6, the reform signi¯cantly decreases the variability of unemployment and production.26
Thus even without ¯scal asymmetry between the two EPL components, the state-contingent
layo® tax continues to smooth employment over the business cycle. Finally, note that the
reform stabilizes production and slightly decreases its mean. This suggests a possible policy
trade-o® between employment variability and net production.
At this stage, the dynamic analysis therefore provides evidence in favor of a state-contingent
layo® tax compared to a standard EPL package. An EPL reform whose mainstay consists
of the introduction of a layo® tax in the place of mandatory ¯ring costs appears to improve
labor market performance by encouraging and stabilizing employment, reducing unemployment
bene¯t expenses and increasing production.
4 Conclusion
Using an equilibrium unemployment model, we have analyzed the advantages of an employment
legislation reform (EPL) which aims to reduce the red tape and legal costs associated with
layo®s and introduce a U.S.-like experience-rating system modelled as a combination of a state-
contingent layo® tax and a payroll subsidy. The state-contingent layo® tax is remarkable since
it is an EPL component with a ¯scal counterpart. Our results suggest that EPL e±ciency
is strongly in°uenced by the design of such a reform. These results are consistent with the
conventional wisdom that experience rating is desirable, not only as a part of unemployment-
compensation ¯nance, as most studies acknowledge, but also as part and parcel of a virtuous
EPL system. The EPL reform considered here yields a number of original results: (i) contrary
to the red tape and legal costs, the e®ects of the layo® tax are asymmetric over the business
cycle; (ii) the EPL reform improves overall labor market performance, hence alleviating the
26The results are robust to the speci¯cation of the balanced-budget rule. The results are available upon request
from the authors
26unemployment insurance budget, increasing production and decreasing the unemployment rate,
the decrease in the latter being more pronounced the more depressed is the macroeconomic
environment; and (iii) the EPL reform reduces the aggregate variability of employment, as the
state-contingent layo® tax smoothes the e®ects of changes in the macroeconomic environment.
More generally, the reform considered shows that it is possible (and desirable) to improve
the e±ciency of employment protection policies while leaving workers' protection unchanged on
the labor market. These results are of particular acuity in the European debate on the con-
tours of employment protection reform, as recently sketched by Blanchard and Tirole (2003a,b)
and Cahuc and Kramarz (2005). They suggest that an EPL package adapted from the U.S.
experience-rating system is an e±cient means of improving labor market performance, while
reducing unemployment and stabilizing employment over the business cycle. It may however be
legitimate to ask questions about the virtue of experience rating, since this system is notably
absent in most OECD countries. In other words, what is the rationale for not implementing
this reform? One possible answer pertains to the time schedule of the reform. A short-run
oriented government (vote-catching) may be reluctant to support the reform due to the ad hoc
losses, and will favor marginal reforms which appear politically less costly. To some extent,
this parallels the experience of Europe, and particularly Continental Europe, where the use of
experience rating has been advocated since the mid 1990's (OECD, 1994) and where marginal
reforms were preferred (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007).
Our research could be extended in several directions. The results advocated in this pa-
per are complementary to the work of Cahuc and Zylberberg (2007) who argue that in an
optimal-taxation framework, \layo® taxes are not only a counterpart to the state provision of
unemployment bene¯ts but also a natural counterpart to other public expenditures". In such
a context, the introduction of a layo® tax allows unemployment's social cost to be taken into
account, where these amount to the unemployment bene¯ts paid to the ¯red worker plus the
¯scal losses to the government when the job is destroyed. From this perspective, an extension
that combines a search and matching framework with optimal taxation will further capture the
distortions induced by ¯rms' layo® decisions. A second, and perhaps more natural, extension
is justi¯ed on the grounds that there is no explicit reason for public policies in our model since
workers are assumed to be risk neutral. With this assumption we have intentionally focussed on
the consequences of the reform on employment and put insurance issues to one side. An exten-
sion incorporating both considerations would allow for an explicit welfare evaluation. Finally, in
order to ¯ne-tune our understanding of EPL reform (or more generally the introduction of layo®
27taxes), it would be useful to consider a model allowing for worker heterogeneity for at least two
reasons: (i) a layo® tax may have redistributive e®ects across individuals with di®erent abilities;
and (ii) a tax might durably exclude workers from the labor market, fostering transitions from
unemployment to inactivity. These developments form part of our future research agenda.
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Appendix
Appendix 1 - Wage Rules
Outsiders' Wages (Entrants) | Negotiation |
Wages are the outcome of a Nash sharing rule providing a share ° 2 [0;1] of the surplus to the
worker. The wage on a new job is given by:
woi("u) = argmax(Voi("u) ¡ Vui)
° (¦oi("u) ¡ ¦vi)
1¡° (A-1)
The bargain yields the following sharing rules:
Voi("u) ¡ Vui = °Soi("u) and ¦oi("u) ¡ ¦vi = (1 ¡ °)Soi("u)
where Soi("u) denotes the surplus on a new job. Taking account of the free-entry condition,
¦vi = 0, we simply obtain:
(1 ¡ °)[Voi("u) ¡ Vui] = °¦oi("u) (A-2)
Using equations (2) and (5), presented in the text, we have:
0





A¦oi("u) = pi + ¾"u ¡ ¿i ¡ woi("u)
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Hence, using the previous expressions with the sharing rules, the outsiders' wage is given by
(11).
Insiders' Wages (Incumbents) | Renegotiation |
The wage on a continuing job is given by:
wi(") = argmax(Vei(") ¡ Vui)° (¦ei(") ¡ ¦vi + f + ¿ei)
1¡° (A-6)
The bargain yields the following sharing rules:
Vei(") ¡ Vui = °Sei(") and ¦ei(") ¡ ¦vi + f + ¿ei = (1 ¡ °)Sei(")
where Sei(") denotes the surplus on a continuing job. Taking account of the free-entry condition,
¦vi = 0, we simply obtain:
(1 ¡ °)(Vei(") ¡ Vui) = ° (¦ei(") + f + ¿ei) (A-7)
Using equations (3) and (6), detailed in the text, we have:
0
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Hence, using the previous equations together with the sharing rules and the expected utility of
an unemployed worker, the insider's wage is given by (12).
32Appendix 2 - Surplus, Job Destruction and Job Creation
Surplus on a New Job
The surplus on a new job is de¯ned by (7). Using equations (2) and (5) detailed in the text
together with the free-entry condition , ¦vi = 0, we have:
0













Then, using the sharing rules detailed above together with (1), (4) and the free-entry condition,
the surplus on a new job in state i is given by:
0





ASoi("u) = pi + ¾"u ¡ ¿i ¡ b ¡
µi°h
1 ¡ °





Surplus on a Continuing Job
The surplus on a continuing job is de¯ned by (8). Using equations (3) and (6) detailed in the
text together with the free-entry condition, ¦vi = 0, we obtain:
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Finally, using the sharing rules detailed above together with (1), (4) and the free-entry condition,
the surplus on a continuing job in state i is given by:
0





ASei(") = pi + ¾" ¡ ¿i ¡ b ¡ µi
°
1 ¡ °















Combining the formal condition for severance (9) with (A-13), it is easy after some algebra to
obtain (13), i.e. the relation de¯ning the job destruction threshold |cuto® productivity| in
state i.
33Job Creation
Combining the sharing rules together with (1) and the free-entry condition, it is straightforward
to obtain h
q(µi) = (1 ¡ °)Soi ("u). Then using this latter expression together with (A-11), after
some algebra we obtain (14), that is the relation de¯ning job creation |labor-market tightness|
in state i.
Appendix 3 - Laws of Motion
Time is divided into discrete periods indexed by the subscript t, where t = 0;1;:::;T represents
a quarterly sequence. Let Nt, Ct, Dt and Yt denote employment at the beginning of period t,
job creation °ows, job destruction °ows and aggregate production at time t respectively. The
aggregate law of motion for employment is:
Nt+1 = Nt + Ct ¡ Dt: (A-14)
We now turn to the equations describing the law of motion for employment for each idiosyncratic
component of productivity ". We assume that the aggregate conditions change at the beginning
of the time period. It follows that once the macroeconomic environment is revealed, the only
remaining source of job destruction is idiosyncratic. Let nt(") and nt+1(") represent the number
of workers whose productivity on the job is " in t and t+1 respectively. The number of workers
whose productivity is " at the beginning of period t + 1 is given by:
nt+1(") =
(






if "u > " ¸ "dit
0 if " < "dit
(A-15)
where "dit is the reservation productivity contingent on the current aggregate state i and for the
time period t. The dynamic law of motion for employment is given by the ¯rst line of equation
(A-15) provided the idiosyncratic component is in the range ["dit;"u[ and by the second term for
all other values. The ¯rst term of (A-15) denotes the mass of jobs that has not been hit by an
idiosyncratic productivity shock whereas the second term refers to the mass of surviving jobs
with job-speci¯c component equal to " that has been hit by an idiosyncratic productivity shock.
The job creation °ow in period t is:
Ct = µitq(µit)(1 ¡ Nt) (A-16)
where µitq(µit) is the job-¯nding rate. Jobs are destroyed for one of two reasons. First, aggregate
conditions may worsen and cause the productivity threshold to be shifted up. As a consequence,
all jobs whose productivity is below the new cut-o® value are destroyed. Second, idiosyncratic
productivity may change at Poisson rate ¸ and cause the job-speci¯c component to fall below












34The laws of motion for unemployment, Ut, for new jobs, nh, and for continuing jobs, nc, are
respectively:
Ut = 1 ¡ Nt; (A-18)
nht+1 = Ct + (1 ¡ ¸)nht (A-19)
nct+1 = nct + ¸[1 ¡ G("dit)]nht ¡ Dt (A-20)
Finally, gross aggregate production, Yt, is the sum of the productivity of new and continuing
jobs:







It follows that net aggregate production is worth:
Y net






¡ µitUth ¡ ¥Dtf (A-22)
where ¥ is a dummy variable which equals 0 if ¯ring costs, f, are real resource costs, and 1
otherwise.
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